Volume 115, Number 458, April 2006

 John Divers
Possible-Worlds Semantics Without Possible Worlds: The Agnostic Approach
Mind 115: 187-226.

 Mario Gómez-Torrente
Rigidity and Essentiality
Mind 115: 227-260.

 Boris Kment
Counterfactuals and Explanation
Mind 115: 261-310.

 A. W. Moore
Williams, Nietzsche, and the Meaninglessness of Immortality
Mind 115: 311-330.

 Luke Robinson
Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism
Mind 115: 331-360.

 Ross Cameron , and Sonia Roca
Rohrbaugh and deRosset on the Necessity of Origin
Mind 115: 361-366.

 Teresa Robertson , and Graeme Forbes
Does the New Route Reach its Destination?
Mind 115: 367-374.

 Guy Rohrbaugh , and Louis deRosset
Prevention, Independence, and Origin
Mind 115: 375-386.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract 1 of 8  ? Divers 2006

Possible-Worlds Semantics Without Possible Worlds: The Agnostic Approach
John Divers
Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TN, England j.divers@sheffield.ac.uk

If a possible-worlds semantic theory for modal logics is pure, then the assertion of the theory, taken at face-value, can bring no commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds (genuine or ersatz). But if we consider an applied theory (an application of the pure theory) in which the elements of the models are required to be possible worlds, then assertion of such a theory, taken at face-value, does appear to bring commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds. Or at least that is so if the applied theory is adequate. For an applied possible-worlds semantic theory that is constrained to contain only one-world models is bound to deliver results on validity, soundness and completeness that are apt to seem disastrous. I attempt to steer a course between commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds and commitment to such a disastrous applied possible-worlds semantics by noting, and developing, the position of one who asserts such a theory at face-value but who remains agnostic about the existence of other (non-actualized) possible worlds. Thus, a novel interpretation of applied possible-worlds semantics is offered on which we may lay claim to whatever benefits such a theory offers while avoiding realism about (other) possible worlds. Thereby, the contention that applied possible-worlds semantics gives us reason to be realists about possible worlds is (further) undermined.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract 2 of 8  ? Gómez-Torrente 2005

Rigidity and Essentiality
Mario Gómez-Torrente
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México D.F. 04510, Mexico mariogt@servidor.unam.mx

Is there a theoretically interesting notion that is a natural extension of the concept of rigidity to general terms? Such a notion ought to satisfy two Kripkean conditions. First, it must apply to typical general terms for natural kinds, stuffs, and phenomena, and fail to apply to most other general terms. Second, true ‘identification sentences’ (such as ‘Cats are animals’) containing general terms that the notion applies to must be necessary. I explore a natural extension of the notion of rigidity to general terms, the notion of an essentialist predicate. I argue that, under natural assumptions, this notion satisfies the two Kripkean conditions.

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Gómez-Torrente]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract 3 of 8  ? Kment 2006

Counterfactuals and Explanation
Boris Kment
On the received view, counterfactuals are analysed using the concept of closeness between possible worlds: the counterfactual ‘If it had been the case that p, then it would have been the case that q’ is true at a world w just in case q is true at all the possible p-worlds closest to w. The degree of closeness between two worlds is usually thought to be determined by weighting different respects of similarity between them. The question I consider in the paper is which weights attach to different respects of similarity. I start by considering Lewis's answer to the question and argue against it by presenting several counterexamples. I use the same examples to motivate a general principle about closeness: if a fact obtains in both of two worlds, then this similarity is relevant to the closeness between them if and only if the fact has the same explanation in the two worlds. I use this principle and some ideas of Lewis's to formulate a general account of counterfactuals, and I argue that this account can explain the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. The paper concludes with a discussion of some examples that cannot be accommodated by the present version of the account and therefore necessitate further work on the details.

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Kment]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract 4 of 8  ? Moore 2006

Williams, Nietzsche, and the Meaninglessness of Immortality
A. W. Moore
St Hugh's College, Oxford, OX2 6LE adrian.moore@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk

In this essay I consider the argument that Bernard Williams advances in ‘The Makropolus Case’ for the meaninglessness of immortality. I also consider various counter-arguments. I suggest that the more clearly these counter-arguments are targeted at the spirit of Williams's argument, rather than at its letter, the less clearly they pose a threat to it. I then turn to Nietzsche, whose views about the eternal recurrence might appear to make him an opponent of Williams. I argue that, properly interpreted, these views in fact make him an ally.

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Moore]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract 5 of 8  ? Robinson 2006

Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism
Luke Robinson
Department of Philosophy, 0119 University of California, San Diego 9500 Gilman Drive La Jolla, CA 92093-0119 USA lukerobinson@ucsd.edu ; (And from 1 August 2006) Department of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University, PO Box 750142, Dallas, TX 75275-0142, USA

Moral principles play important roles in diverse areas of moral thought, practice, and theory. Many who think of themselves as ‘moral generalists’ believe that moral principles can play these roles—that they are capable of doing so. Moral generalism maintains that moral principles can and do play these roles because true moral principles are statements of general moral fact (i.e. statements of facts about the moral attributes of kinds of actions, kinds of states of affairs, etc.) and because general moral facts explain particular moral facts (i.e. facts about the moral attributes of particulars). Moral holism maintains that what is a moral reason to  in one case may not be one in another, and may even be a moral reason not to  given suitable circumstances. Some ‘moral particularists’ maintain that moral holism motivates scepticism about the existence of and need for moral principles, along with scepticism about the viability of principle-based approaches to ethics and moral theory. But I argue that moral holism is itself a form of moral generalism, one that takes facts about the right- and wrong-making powers of (generic) moral factors to explain certain particular moral facts—namely, the rightness and wrongness of particular actions. I also argue that a moral-theoretic version of dispositionalism—the view that dispositions, powers, or capacities are the fundamental units of explanation—explains both why moral holism is true and why moral generalism is true.

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Robinson]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract 6 of 8  ? Cameron and Roca 2006

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussions

Rohrbaugh and deRosset on the Necessity of Origin
Ross Cameron1 and Sonia Roca2,3
1 Arché: AHRB Research Center for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics and Mind University of St. Andrews rpc2@st-andrews.ac.uk , 2 Logos: Research Group in Logic, Language and Cognition, Department of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science, University of Barcelona, 3 Arché: AHRB Research Center for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics and Mind University of St. Andrews sonia@rocaroyes.net

In ‘A New Route to the Necessity of Origin’, Rohbraugh and deRosset offer an argument for the Necessity of Origin appealing neither to Suffciency of Origin nor to a branching-times model of necessity. What is doing the crucial work in their argument is instead the thesis they name ‘Locality of Prevention’. In this response, we object that their argument is question-begging by showing, first, that the locality of prevention thesis is not strong enough to satisfactorily derive from it the intended conclusion, and, second, that the argument is not sound unless the Necessity of Origin is operating as an implicit premiss.

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Cameron and Roca]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract 7 of 8  ? Robertson and Forbes 2006

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussions

Does the New Route Reach its Destination?
Teresa Robertson1 and Graeme Forbes2
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1445 Jayhawk Blvd, Room 3090, Lawrence, KS 66045 USA teresa@ku.edu , 2 Department of Philosophy, Tulane University, 105 Newcomb Hall New Orleans, LA 70118 USA forbes@tulane.edu

In ‘A New Route to the Necessity of Origin’, Guy Rohrbaugh and Louis deRossett argue for the Necessity of Origin in a way that they believe avoids use of any kind of transworld constitutional sufficiency principle. In this discussion, we respond that either their arguments do imply a sufficiency principle, or else they entirely fail to establish the Necessity of Origin.

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Robertson and Forbes]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract 8 of 8  ? Rohrbaugh and deRosset 2006

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussions

Prevention, Independence, and Origin
Guy Rohrbaugh1 and Louis deRosset2
1 Auburn University, Department of Philosophy, Haley Center 6080 Auburn, AL 36849, USA rohrbgn@auburn.edu , 2 University of Vermont, Philosophy Department, 70 South Williams Street Burlington, VT 05401, USA Louis.deRosset@uvm.edu

In ‘A New Route to the Necessity of Origin’ (2004, henceforth ‘NR’), we offered an argument for the thesis that there are necessary connections between material things and their material origins. Much of the philosophical interest lay in our claim that the argument did not depend on so-called sufficiency principles for crossworld identity. It has been the verdict of much recent work on the necessity of origin that valid arguments for the thesis require some such sufficiency principle as a premise but that such principles are deeply problematic.1 Finding an argument free of such principles would advance both our understanding and the plausibility of that thesis. These claims are now the subject of a pair of insightful critiques by Teresa Robertson and Graeme Forbes (2006, henceforth ‘RF’) and by Ross Cameron and Sonia Roca (2006, henceforth ‘CR’), and we welcome the opportunity to clarify and improve our account of the matter.

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Rohrbaugh and deRosset]