兹定于2008年7月22日（星期二）上午10:00-11:30，社科院哲学所科哲室唐热风副研究员做题为Experience as Attitudinal（论经验即信念）的专题报告。地点：哲学所940会议室，望有兴趣者参加。

　　哲学所科哲室

　　2008年7月15日

　　附唐热风的报告提纲

　　论经验即信念 (Experience As Doxastic)

　　1．什么是经验？

　　经验即人类知觉 (human mature perception)

　　2. 非概念论(nonconceptualism)、概念论(conceptualism)、信念论(Doxasticism)

　　非概念论：经验独立于概念

　　概念论：经验是概念的

　　信念论：经验即信念（看见即相信）

　　信念论不是一个中立于非概念论与概念论的观点，而是在概念论的基础上向前推进一步

　　3．信念论的知识论动机

　　3.1 概念论之相当于非概念论的知识论优势

　　3.2 知识辩护的信念标准(the doxastic criterion of justification)及概念论的知识论困境

　　知识辩护的信念标准：只有信念能够辩护信念

　　4．对信念论的两点澄清

　　4.1 信念论认为经验即信念，而非我们总是相信自己的经验

　　Armstrong: Perception is the acquiring of true or false beliefs. But perceptions are not beliefs. Belief is a dispositional state of mind. A believing subject does not have to be a conscious subject. ‘It makes sense to say that A believes p, but that A is asleep, or unconscious’ (Armstrong 1968, 127). But perceptions are definite events that take place at definite instants and are then over.

　　4.2 信念论认为经验是有意识的、语言概念化的信念

　　Armstrong: ‘If perception is the acquiring of beliefs or information then clearly it must involve the possession of concepts. For to believe that A is B entails possessing the concepts of A and B’ (128). ‘…since perception can occur in the total absence of the ability to speak, we are committed to the view that there can be concepts that involve no linguistic ability’ (128). Perceptual beliefs, that is, beliefs acquired from perception ‘must be conceived of as sub-verbal beliefs’ (127).

　　Smith: Perceptual consciousness is nonconceptual, but intrinsically doxastic, or engaged. It is ‘in reactive and responsive engagement with the environment’ (Smith 2001, 308).

　　5．第一步论证：经验的客体组成论(object constituent analysis)-经验以其终极对象为组成部分

　　5.1 经验的物理对象(physical object)与心的对象(mental object)

　　5.1.1 知觉的客体独立性及Thomas Reid对此所作的反应。

　　知觉的客体独立性: There is an important distinction between sensation and perception. While the object of sensation ‘appears to be something which can have no existence but in a sentient mind’, the object of perception ‘may exist whether it be perceived or not’ (Reid, 1997, 167-8). And it is this feature of perception, according to Reid, which gives the sceptic a reason for separating perception and belief. The reason is that ‘as the object may exist without being perceived, so the perception may exist without an object’ (169).

　　5.1.2 正常经验与非正常经验

　　正常经验以物理对象为组成成分，非正常经验以心的对象为组成成分

　　5.2 客体组成论与感觉材料说(sense data theories)及分离论（或析取论）(disjunctivism)的区别

　　感觉材料说：知觉的直接对象是感觉材料，而非客体本身。

　　两种形式的分离论：

　　McDowell的经验的世界开放说(openness of experience to the world): 真实经验(veridical experience)以客体为直接知觉对象，非真实经验(nonveridical experience)或者以中介于主体与客体的外观(appearance)为直接知觉对象

　　Martin的朴素实在论(naive realism): 在真实知觉中，客体是经验的组成成分；在非真实知觉中，经验的组成成分是一个涵盖知识经验与非真实经验的外观。

　　5.3 感觉材料说与分离论皆以知识经验与非真实经验的划分为基础，而这个划分是有问题的。

　　6．第二步论证：经验因实施概念能力而将其终极对象经验为其终极对象

　　6.1 经验不能独立于概念

　　Cowley: ‘whatever we see or hear, we see or hear as such-and-such, or as is sometimes said, under a certain description. And different people see or hear the same thing under different descriptions’ (Cowley 1968).

　　6.2 概念不能独立于语言

　　The priority thesis: language is the vehicle of thought; language is prior to thought in the order of philosophical explanation (Dummett 1991, 315).

　　The theorist of thought: thought is more fundamental than language in the order of philosophical explanation (Peacocke 1997, 3).

　　The no-priority thesis: ‘neither language nor thinking can be fully explained in terms of the other, and neither has conceptual priority’ (Davidson 1984).

　　7．第三步论证：经验是概念能力的彻底实施，即作出判断或形成信念

　　7.1 概念能力的本质在于作出判断或形成信念，而不只是将世界结构化

　　7.2 经验不是概念能力的部分实现，而是概念能力的彻底实施

　　8．结论：经验是关于世界的有意识的、概念性的信念

　　Strawson: ‘perceptual judgement’ is ‘internal to the characterization of the experience’ (Strawson 1979, 95).

　　9．信念论与经验透明说(The transparency thesis)的区分

　　Moore: ‘In general, that which makes a sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us: it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent – we look through it and see nothing but the blue…When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous’ (Moore 1903)

　　References

　　Armstrong, D. M. 1968. Perception and Belief. Reprinted in Dancy ed. Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press.

　　Cowley, Fraser. 1968. A Critique of British Empiricism. MaCmillan: St Martin’s Press.

　　Davidson, Donald. 1984. Thought and Talk. Reprinted in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

　　Dummett, Michael. 1991. The Relative Priority of Thought and Language. In his Frege and Other Philosophers. Oxford.

　　Moore, G. E. 1903. The Refutation of Idealism. Reprinted in his Selected Writings, Thomas Baldwin ed. London: Routledge 1993.

　　Peacocke, Christopher. 1997. Concepts without Words. In Richard G. Heck, Jnr. ed. Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. OUP

　　Reid, Thomas. 1997. A Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of common Sense, edited by D. Brookes. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press.

　　Smith, A.D. 2001. Perception and Belief, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. LXII, No. 2.

　　Strawson, P. F. 1979. Perception and its Objects, reprinted in Dancy 1988.